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[7] Finally, it is asserted by defendants that a recovery
could not be had for money had and received because the tax
refund was received by Hercules, which was removed as a
party to the action, rather than defendant. Without going into
the question of whether the action was for money had and received or on the contracts, it is clear that the tax refund received by Hercules was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs
under the agreements which provided that if the refund was
received by Hercules, defendant would cause Hercules to assign it to plaintiffs since all the stock and assets of Hercules
had been delivered to defendant at that time pursuant to the
agreements.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, ,J., concurred in the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18702.

In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1952.]

GREGORY S. STOUT et al., Petitioners, v. DEMOCRATIC
COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE et al., Respondents; FITZGERALD AMES et al., Real Parties in Interest.
[1] Mandamus-Title to Office.-Generally, title to public office
cannot be tried in a mandamus proceeding for the reason
that quo warranto is an adequate remedy.
[2] !d.-Existence of Office.-It is proper in mandamus to determine whether the office claimed by a person legally exists.
[3] !d.-Title to Office.-Title to office may be incidentally determined in mandamus, and discretion rests with the court
to determine whether the title should be so determined.
[4] Quo Warranto-Trying Title to Office.-Generally, quo warranto is appropriate only where there is involved a public
office in the sense that the incumbent exercises some of the
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 22; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 225.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 5; Am.Jur., Quo Warranto,
§ 22.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6] Mandamus, § 18; [4, 5] Quo
Warranto, § 5; [7] Elections, § 34.
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sovereign powers of government; a party committeeman is
not such an officer because he performs duties and exercises
powers for a particular political party rather than the sovereign power of the public.
[5] Id.-Trying Title to Of!ice.-lt is doubtful whether additional
committee mmuberships created by a majority vote of a county
central committee pursuant to Elec. Code, § 2833, are public
officers for the purpose of quo warranto.
[6] Mandamus-Existence of Office.-Where the real question presented is whether there exists offices of additional committee
memberships created by a majority vote of a county central
committee pursuant to Elec. Code, § 2833, and title of the
persons named to such additional offices is incidental to such
question, mandamus is the proper remedy.
[7] Elections-Nominations-Political Parties-County Central
Committee.-That part of Elec. Code, § 2833, declaring that
"The county committee in any city and county [which can
only be San Francisco, it being the only city and county in
the state] may increase its membership by a majority vote
of the committee," is invalid as local and special legislation, there being no rational basis for the provision that in
such county an unspecified additional number, above the
number fixed as in other counties by assembly districts, may
be appointed by the committee.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Democratic
County Central Committee of San Francisco to revoke appointments of additional committeemen. Writ granted.
Delauy, Fishgold & Minudri, Molly H. Minudri and Manuel
Furtado for Petitioners.
Albert Brundage, in pro. per., for Respondent Louise T.
0 'Connor et al.
Thomas E. Feeney, Robert I. McCarthy and A. J. Zirpoli
for Respondent Committee et al., and Real Parties in Interest.
CAR'l'ER, J.-Seven of the petitioners in this petition for
a writ of mandate were duly elected at the June, 1952, primary election as members of the Democratic County Central
Committee for the City and County of San Francisco; one
petitioner, Collins, is an ex officio member by reason of section 2838 of the Elections Code which makes the nominee of
the party for state senator or the incumbent of the nominees
of the party for the assembly ex officio a member of the county
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central committee. Respondents are the Democratic County
Central Committee and 23 duly elected members of the committee. Designated as real parties in interest are 25 persons
who, after the primary election, were appointed by a majority of the committee to serve as additional committee
members pursuant to section 2833 of the Elections Code. 1
Charging that the italicized portion of section 2833, supra,
violates various provisions of the Constitution forbidding local
and special laws (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; art. IV, § 25 ( 9)),
petitioners assert that the real parties in interest are unlawfully holding the position of committeemen and request that
the committee be ordered by a writ of mandate to revoke their
appointment.
Respondents claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy
here; that quo warranto is; and that section 2833 of the
Elections Code, S1lpra, is valid.
[1] Turning first to the question of remedy, it may be
said generally that title to public office cannot be tried in a
mandamus proceeding (Nicler v. City Comrm:ss1:on, 36 Cal.
App.2d 14, 26 [97 P.2d 293]; Black v. Boarcl of Pol1:cc
Commrs., 17 Cal.App. 310 [119 P. 674]; Meredith v. Boarcl
of Supervisors, 50 Cal. 433; H urnburg v. Boarcl of Police &
Fire Cornrnrs., 27 Cal.App. 6 [148 P. 802]; People v. Baney,
30 Cal.App. 581 [158 P. 1036] ; People v. Olds, 3 Cal. 167
[58 Am.Dec. 398]; 16 CaLTur. 792) for the reason that quo
warranto is an adequate remedy. There are, however, many
limitations on that rule and it cannot be applied in all cases.
(See 22 Cal.Jur. 792 et seq.; 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 189, 211.)
Various reasons are given for the rule, such as that where
there are two claimants for the office, one 'would not be a
party in the mandamus proceeding and complete relief could
not be given, and that when title to a public office is involved,
sovereign power by quo warranto should be invoked in preference to private interests in order to avoid undue interference
with government. (See High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies,
§ 49 et seq.; People v. Olds, supra, 3 Cal. 167.) [2] Considering the foregoing factors, it has been held proprr in mandamus to determine whether the office claimed by a person
"'In any city and county the county central committee of eacl1 party
shall be elected by each assembly district and shall consist of five members from each assembly district in the city and county. The cottnty
committee in any city and county may increase its mernbership by a
majority vote of the committee.'' (Italics added.) (Elections Code,
§ 2833.)
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legally exists. (Spau,lding v. Desmond, 188 Cal. 783 [207 P.
896] .) [3] 'fitle to office may be incidentally determined
in mandamus (McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711 [91 P. 598,
121 Arn.St.Rep. 146, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 661] ; Bannerman v. Boyle,
160 Cal. 197 [116 P. 732]; Brennan v. Riley, 3 Cal.2d 736 [46
P.2d 972] ; Klose v. S11pe1·ior Cmtrt, 96 Cal.App.2d 913 [217
P.2d 97]) and discretion rests with the court to determine
whether the title should be so determined. (McKannay v.
Horton, supra, 151 Cal. 711; Klose v. Superior Court, supra,
96 Cal. A pp.2d 913.) [ 4] Generally, quo warranto is appropriate only where there is involved a public office in the sense
that the incumbent exercises some of the sovereign powers of
government (Co1tlter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181 [201 P. 120];
People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636 [107 P.2d
388]; Leyrnel v. Johnson, 105 Cal.App. 694 [288 P. 858] ),
and it has been held that a party committeeman is not such
an officer because he performs duties and exercises powers
for a particular political party rather than the sovereign
power of the public (Tuck v. Cotton, 175 Ark. 409 [299 S.W.
613] ; People v. Bracly, 302 Ill. 576 [135 N.E. 87] ; Attorney
General v. D1·ohan, 169 Mass. 534 [48 N.E. 279, 61 Arn.St.Rep.
301] ; contra Dashtgne v. Cohen, 14 La.App. 475 [131 So.
746]; klorris v. Peters, 203 Ga. 350 [46 S.E.2d 729] ). We
recognize, of course, that such committeemen perform important duties as a means through which the right of suffrage is
exercised (Independent Prog1·essive Party v. County Clerks,
31 Cal.2c1 549 [191 P.2d 6]) and primaries are a part of the
election process (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d 592, 596 [226 P.2d
1]).
[5] In the instant case we have only one claimant to each
of the ''offices'' (the additional committee memberships
created) and it is doubtful that they are public officers for the
purpose of quo warranto. [6] The real question presented
is whether those offices exist at all, because their existence
depends upon the validity of the italicized portion of section
2833 of the Elections Code, sttpra. 'rhe title of the persons
named to those additional offices is incidental to that main
question. \Ve hold, therefore, that mandamus is the proper
remedy. 'l'he case of JJlalone v. S1tperior Cmtrt, (Cal.App.)*
249 P .2d 324 (Oct. 30, 1952), being out of harmony with these
views is disapproved.
[7] Concerning the validity of section 2833, it appears
that it applies only to cities and counties. There is only
·»A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on December 19, 1952.
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one city and county in the state, namely, San Francisco,
and it is the only place where the membership of the county
central committee may be increased and the additional members appointed by the committee. The law applicable to
other counties is as follows: In counties with four assembly
districts the committee is elected by supervisor districts,
five members for each district (Elec. Code, § 2835.5); in
counties with less than four assembly districts the committee
is elected by supervisor districts, the number being based
on a formula applied to the number of votes cast at the
last gubernatorial election but not less than 21 members
(id. § 2837) ; in counties with 20 or more assembly districts
there are seven members for each district ( id. § 2834) ; in
counties with more than five and less than 20 assembly
districts there are five members for each district ( id. § 2835) .
.Assembly districts are established on the basis of population distribution. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 6.) Thus the
number of committeemen are apportioned according to population as determined by the Legislature, and are chosen
by the electorate except in San Francisco. We can see no
rational basis for such a classification. While it is true that
the other counties in the state are classified according to the
number of assembly districts, or the voters at the last election, which may be a reasonable basis, there is no basis for
the selection of one county in the state, and provision that
in such county, an unspecified additional number, above the
number fixed as in the other counties by assembly districts,
may be appointed by the committee. There is no conceivable
reason why the number and nonlegislative ascertainment
thereof should be different. There is no reasonable relation
between the method of ascertaining the number and the
population or the fact that San Francisco City and County
is a compact area with little or no rural territory. The
recent case of Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d
562], is closely in point. We there held a statute which
limited the number of notaries public in San Francisco was
an invalid special and local law. We there said : ''The legislation on its face expressly chooses without reason to limit
the number of notaries for one county, and one county only,
thus leaving no room for the presumption of constitutionality
or for the presumption that the Legislature had a conceivably rational basis for the limitation on the number of notaries
for San Francisco, or the presumption of constitutionality
from the long existence of the statute without attack. . .. "
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''The most recent expression by this court in regard to
special and local laws, and what constitutes a proper basis
for the classification of counties, is contained in Consolidated
P1·inting & Publ. Co. v. Allen, 18 Cal.2d 63 [112 P.2d 884].
'l'here the statute provided a method for the publication of
delinquent tax lists for counties of the first class (Los Angeles is the only county of that class) different from that
for all other counties. In holding the statute invalid this
court said: 'We find no natural, intrinsic, or constitutional
ground of distinction between the county of Los Angeles
and other counties which would justify the application of
a special procedure with reference to the sale of delinquent
property.' "
We hold, therefore, that the italicized portion of section
2833 of the Elections Code, supra, is invalid, and it is ordered
that a peremptory writ of mandate issue, commanding respondents to revoke the appointment of the additional members to the Democratic Central Committee for San Francisco
City and County. Each party shall pay his own costs in this
proceeding. Pursuant to stipulation the writ issued hereunder
may be served upon counsel for respondents and real parties
in interest in lieu of service on each respondent and real party
in interest. Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, ,J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-That mandate lies solely to compel the
performance of a duty especially enjoined by law is well
established. (Spaulding v. Desmond, 188 Cal. 783, 789 [207
P. 896], and cases cited therein.) I dissented in Hollman v.
W an·en, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562], on the ground that
the petitioner failed to establish a clear legal duty upon the
governor to consider her application. In the present case,
the petitioners have even less basis for the position that the
elected members of the committee have a duty to revoke the
appointments made by them pursuant to the challenged code
section. The only purpose of this proceeding is to compel
them to do so. Even if it be conceded that the statute is unconstitutional, no showing is made that the committee has a
clear legal duty to revoke the appointments.
I would, therefore, deny the peremptory writ.

